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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Cuban exports to the United 
States held a privileged position in the U.S. market. Many of Cuba’s 
exports received at least 20% less in duties than competitors and after 
1934, Cuba’s main export—sugarhad a guaranteed quota in the U.S. 
market. Yet Cuban and U.S. scholars alike criticize these trade 
agreements—specifically the Reciprocity Convention of 19021 and the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 19342—as having condemned Cuba to a 
monoculture economy. For example, Zanetti argues that as a result of the 
Reciprocity Convention, “the monoculture nature of the Cuban economy 
was accentuated to the point that it was deformed.”3 Steward, referring to 
                                                                                                                     
*   Paper presented to the University of Florida and University of Havana Conference on 
Law and Policy in the Americas, May 9–10, 2016, Havana, Cuba. 
**   Distinguished Professor Emerita of Latin American Studies and Food & Resource 
Economics, University of Florida. 
 1.  Commercial Convention Between the United States and Cuba, Cuba-U.S., art. II, Dec. 
11, 1902, 33 Stat. 2136, 2137 [hereinafter 1902 Reciprocity Convention]. 
 2.  Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States of America and Cuba, Cuba-
U.S., Aug. 24, 1934, E.A.S. 67 [hereinafter Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934]; see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN AGRIC. BULL. NO. 2, THE AGRICULTURE OF CUBA 39 (1942) [hereinafter 
AGRICULTURE OF CUBA]. 
 3.  OSCAR ZANETTI, LOS CAUTIVOS DE LA RECIPROCIDAD 89 (2003). 
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the 1934 Treaty, concludes “monoculture, not viability was the chief 
result of the treaty.”4 
Moreover, critics contend that the treaties led to U.S. capital 
dominating Cuba’s sugar industry, and that U.S investors in Cuba, along 
with mainland sugar refineries, gained the most from the treaties. In 
addition, the treaties did little to diversify the Cuban economy, instead 
maintaining the country’s food dependence while discouraging its 
industrial development. Further, what little export diversification was 
achieved, such as the development of non-traditional agricultural exports, 
was insignificant and provided few benefits to Cubans.  
This paper considers the latter charge—the extent to which these trade 
agreements facilitated the development of non-traditional agricultural 
exports and whether that development only benefitted U.S. interests. A 
considerable literature has examined the first two issues.5 But the 
question of export diversification has not yet been examined in much 
depth. I do so here by undertaking a detailed analysis of Cuba’s non-sugar 
and tobacco exports (NST) to the United States, focusing on the 
development of non-traditional exports of fruits and vegetables. 
I show that in response to the favorable duty treatment provided by 
the 1902 Reciprocity Convention, non-traditional agricultural exports 
grew rapidly and that this increase was largely the initiative of American 
colonists in Cuba. However, by the 1930s, the colonies were in demise, 
and the export of these crops had largely passed to Cuban producers. 
Moreover, after the 1934 treaty granted Cuban fruits and vegetables 
exports further duty-free treatment, Cuba became the main foreign 
supplier of a variety of vegetables to the United States, complementing 
its already-existing dominance in grapefruits and pineapples. In addition, 
Cuba developed its fruit and vegetable processing industry during this 
period, which also contributed to it further diversifying its exports. 
Nonetheless, over this period, Cuban exports of NST fresh and processed 
agricultural products never amounted to more than 4% of Cuba’s total 
exports, largely because of the continued dominance of sugar exports.  
The next Part presents an overview of the two trade treaties. After this 
overview, I analyze the development of fruit and vegetable exports to the 
United States up until the early 1920s as well as the rise and decline of 
the American colonies in Cuba. The subsequent section considers the 
                                                                                                                     
 4.  DICK STEWARD, TRADE AND HEMISPHERE: THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY AND 
RECIPROCAL TRADE 111 (1975).  
 5.  See, e.g., LELAND HAMILTON JENKS, OUR CUBAN COLONY: A STUDY IN SUGAR (Arno 
Press 1970) (1928); ARTHUR MACEWAN, REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CUBA 
(1981). 
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impact of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, the development of 
Cuba’s processing industry, and the trajectory of non-traditional exports 
until the U.S. embargo on Cuba was imposed. The concluding section 
considers why the trade agreements alone did not have a broader impact 
on the diversification of Cuban exports.  
II. THE RECIPROCITY TREATIES 
The 1902 Reciprocity Convention between the United States and 
Cuba was a quid pro quo for Cuba’s agreement to include the infamous 
Platt Amendment in its 1902 Constitution. The Platt Amendment spelled 
out eight conditions deemed necessary to withdraw U.S. military forces 
from the island after the Cuban-Spanish-American War and to transfer 
sovereignty to the Cuban people.6 Among them was the right of the 
United States “to intervene in Cuban affairs in order to defend Cuban 
independence and to maintain ‘a government adequate for the protection 
of life, property, and individual liberty.’”7 Notwithstanding considerable 
opposition, the Cuban Constitutional Convention acquiesced when the 
McKinley administration “promised them a trade treaty that would 
guarantee Cuban sugar exports access to the U.S. market.”8 
The 1902 Reciprocity Convention maintained duty free access to the 
U.S. market for those products that at the time were being imported from 
Cuba free of duty; and it granted Cuba a special 20% reduction on the 
duty rates provided for in the 1897 U.S. Tariff Act.9 In return, Cuba ceded 
to the United States a similar guarantee to maintain existing provisions 
for duty free access for certain items, and duty reductions of 25% to 40% 
on a range of products that Cuba imported at the time.10  
The main Cuban agricultural exports that entered the U.S. duty free 
at this time were cacao, coffee, bananas and plantains, and coconuts.11 
For a brief period in the early 1890s, sugar and molasses had been on the 
                                                                                                                     
 6.  Act of Mar. 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 895, 897. 
 7.  The United States, Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/86557.htm [https://perma.cc/BK78-P2JV] (last 
visited July 27, 2017) (quoting Act of Mar. 2). 
 8.  Id. See also ZANETTI, supra note 3, for a detailed treatment of those in favor and against 
the Platt Amendment and the Reciprocity Convention both in Cuba and in the United States.  
 9.  1902 Reciprocity Convention, supra note 1, at art. II. 
 10.  Id. at art. IV, scheds. A–D. 
 11.  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN COMMERCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES FORMING THE TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES 
WITH THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD IN EACH YEAR FROM 1895 TO 1905, at 76–77 (1906).  
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free list, but the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act rescinded this status.12 
Thus, the primary immediate benefit to Cuba from the 1902 Reciprocity 
Convention was the 20% reduction on the duty on sugar, which allowed 
Cuba’s main export to gain market share. Cuba’s share of U.S. sugar 
imports increased from 35% in 1900–03, to 91% a decade later, and to 
98% by 1922–25.13 The European sugar beet industry and the Dutch East 
Indies and British West Indies cane sugar exporters suffered most of the 
loss.14  
The 1913 Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act sharply lowered U.S. 
tariffs across the board, and provided an additional incentive for 
production and export of non-traditional commodities from Cuba.15 
However, this potential stimulus was relatively short-lived. The Fordney-
McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 raised the average duty on all U.S. imports 
to 14% from the 9.1% that had prevailed under the Underwood-Simmons 
Tariff Act.16 Then, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 increased duties 
to the levels prevailing at the beginning of the century, with the average 
duty reaching 19.6% in 1932.17 As partial cause and consequence of the 
Great Depression, trade between the United States and Cuba as well as 
global trade subsequently contracted severely. 
The 1934 Reciprocal Agreement between the United States and Cuba 
was one of eleven reciprocal agreements with Latin American countries 
(out of a total 16 such agreements) that the United States negotiated 
between 1934 and 1940 with the explicit aim of increasing U.S. exports.18 
Although not the initial intent, these reciprocal agreements have come to 
be seen as the economic arm of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy in the 
hemisphere, a policy initiative that provided many Latin American 
countries with a potential way out of the Great Depression through 
increased trade. The rationale responded as much to the deteriorating U.S. 
trade position in the region as to Latin America’s falling purchasing 
power.19  
                                                                                                                     
 12.  ALFRED E. ECKES, JR., OPENING AMERICA’S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 
SINCE 1776, at 74 (1995); see also Tariff of 1894, 28 Stat. 509, sched. E.  
 13.  U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, THE EFFECTS OF THE CUBAN RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1902 tbl.12 
(1929).  
 14.  See, e.g., id. at tbl.13. Cuba also supplied a growing share of U.S. domestic 
consumption requirements. While sugar imports from Cuba more than doubled between 1910–13 
and 1922–25, supplies from the non-contiguous territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands and the Philippines grew by only 42% over this period. See id. at tbl.12. 
 15.  ECKES, supra note 12, at 85.  
 16.  Id. at 88, 107 tbl.4.1. 
 17.  Id. at 107 tbl.4.1. 
 18.  STEWARD, supra note 4. 
 19.  See id. at 21. Between 1929 and 1932 the value of U.S. exports to the region declined 
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The reciprocal agreement with Cuba was the first that went into effect 
and it differed from others negotiated in this period in that it maintained 
Cuba’s special trading relationship with the United States and it did not 
include most-favored-nation treatment. Hence, the negotiations for the 
Cuban agreement did not have the objective of promoting freer world 
trade as did the other agreements, but rather, the Cuban agreement 
focused specifically on bilateral concessions aimed at containing 
economic and political instability.20 As a monoculture economy 
dependent on sugar exports for foreign exchange, the Great Depression 
and the associated fall in the price and volume of sugar exported hit Cuba 
particularly hard. Whereas in 1924 Cuba had been the United States’ sixth 
largest export market, by 1933 it ranked sixteenth.21 Moreover, U.S. 
investments in Cuba were exceeded only by U.S. investments in 
Canada.22 As Steward argues, “The United States was well aware that 
Cuba needed stability and prosperity to safeguard U.S. investments in 
Cuba.”23  
Negotiations over the trade agreement took place as the U.S. 
Congress was once again revising U.S. sugar policy. The May 1934 
Jones-Costigan Act assured Cuba a fixed quota of 1.9 million short tons 
of sugar in the U.S. market and reduced the duty for Cuban sugar from 
that stipulated in Smoot-Hawley of 2 cents to 1.5 cents per pound.24 The 
final U.S.-Cuba Reciprocal Trade Agreement of September 1934 
included a further concession on sugar, reducing the duty to 0.9 cents per 
pound.25 
Besides reaffirming Cuba’s 20% duty preference granted in the 1902 
Reciprocity Convention, the 1934 treaty gave many Cuban fruit and 
vegetable exports even greater preferential treatment during the U.S. 
winter season, providing minimum concessions of from 40% to 50%.26 A 
few products received an additional duty concession year-round, such as 
                                                                                                                     
by 78%, while imports from Latin America declined by 68%. Besides the decline in the absolute 
volume of trade, the sharp fall in price of many Latin American export commodities also eroded 
its purchasing power. Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 89. 
 22.  Id. at 93. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 107. 
 25.  Id. at 108. 
 26.  Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, supra note 2, at sched. II. Cuba’s vegetables 
could be planted earlier than in Florida and Texas, thus provisioning the U.S. market when 
domestic supplies were low. This pattern had already developed prior to the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement. Roberta P. Wakefield, Some Factors in Cuba’s Foreign Trade, 13 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 
109, 109–125 (1937).  
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the 40% reduction on Cuban pineapples and a 50% reduction on 
processed fruit.27  
Cuban concessions to the United States included a reduction in the 
duty on food items such as meat, lard, vegetable oils, wheat flour, rice 
and potatoes.28 According to Steward,29 Cubans thought Cuba gave up 
too much, since the agreement stood to ruin its lard and oil industries, and 
because the negotiators failed to regain a quota on Cuban tobacco in the 
U.S. market.30 
The U.S. Sugar Act of 1937 for the first time created a fixed quota 
system based on total U.S. consumption requirements, and it allotted 
Cuba allotted 28.6% of the U.S. market.31 According to Steward,32 this 
quota amounted to about the same share of Cuban raw sugar but slightly 
less of its processed sugar exports. The Cuban government then lobbied 
for a further reduction in the sugar duty and a restoration of the tobacco 
quota that it had failed to gain in 1934.33 These negotiations resulted in 
two additional amendments to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, in 
1939 and 1941, which further lowered the duty on Cuban raw sugar and 
provided some concessions on tobacco; these amendments also gave 
further duty reductions to some U.S. exports to Cuba.34 
In the post-World War II period, one of the main U.S. objectives was 
to achieve a general liberalization of global trade through the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), negotiated by 23 countries in 
1947.35 Cuba understandably worried that it would lose its special 
preferences in the U.S. market. As a condition of its joining GATT, Cuba 
negotiated an exclusive 1947 agreement with the United States that 
supplemented GATT maintaining most of its preferences, and that even 
reduced duties further on raw sugar and a number of other items.36 
Through the Torquay Trade Agreement of 1951, which was linked to 
meeting the provisions of GATT, Cuba benefited from a lowering of U.S. 
                                                                                                                     
 27.  Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934, supra note 2, at sched. II. 
 28.  Id. at sched. I. 
 29.  STEWARD, supra note 4. 
 30.  See ZANETTI, supra note 3, for a similar criticism and a more detailed analysis of the 
impact on Cuba of the U.S. sugar policy. 
 31.  ROBERT F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: BUSINESS AND DIPLOMACY, 1917–
1960, at 168 (1960). 
 32.  STEWARD, supra note 4, at 115. 
 33.  Id. at 115–22. 
 34.  Reciprocal Trade: Second Supplementary Agreement and an Exchange of Notes 
Between the United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 23, 1941, E.A.S. 229; Reciprocal Trade: 
Supplementary Agreement and an Accompanying Protocol Between the United States of America 
and Cuba, Dec. 18, 1939, E.A.S. 165, at 810. 
 35.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11.  
 36.  SMITH, supra note 31, at 168.  
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tariffs on many of its exports and modifications of tariff concessions it 
had previously granted the United States.37  
Another important change in the post-WWII period was in the method 
of calculating the U.S. sugar quota allocation. The U.S. Sugar Act of 1948 
provided for fixed annual quotas for U.S. domestic producers and 
territories then allocated the remaining amount of projected U.S. 
consumption according to percentage quotas.38 Cuba received 98.6% of 
this remainder, subject to a guaranteed floor of 28.6% of total U.S. 
consumption requirements.39 Congress renewed this system in 1952 and 
1956, thus continuing to favor Cuba above other global producers until 
July 1960, when President Eisenhower eliminated Cuba’s sugar quota for 
the remainder of that year.40 Then in October 1960 the United States 
declared an embargo of Cuba (except for food and medicine),41 and in 
January 1961 cut diplomatic relations with the island. The United States 
formally rescinded the 1902 Reciprocity Convention in August 1963.42 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA’S NON-TRADITIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
American colonists in Cuba largely initiated production of citrus, 
pineapple, and winter vegetables for the U.S. market.43 Spurred by the 
political stability promised by the Platt Amendment and the economic 
incentives of the Reciprocity Treaty, and facilitated by the great number 
of U.S. land companies that rushed to buy land in Cuba during the U.S. 
occupation,44 by the end of the teens there were around 80 American 
colonies in Cuba.45 While citrus producers largely concentrated in the 
                                                                                                                     
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 169. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  25 Fed. Reg. 10,00613. Congress authorized a complete embargo of trade with Cuba 
in September 1961, 75 Stat. 444 (1961), and by February 1962 almost all imports from Cuba had 
ceased, 76 Stat. 1446, Pres. Proc. No. 3447. 
 42.  6 CHARLES I. BEVANS, Reciprocal Trade, in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17761949, at 1198 (1968). 
 43.  See, e.g., LEIDA FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, CUBA AGRÍCOLA: MITO Y TRADICIÓN, 18781920, 
at 26364, 29596 (2005). The colonies are referred to in the literature as the “American 
colonies,” because the majority were made up of U.S. emigrants, but they also included Canadian, 
British, German, and Scandinavian settlers. See also GEORGE RENO, CUBA: WHAT SHE HAS TO 
OFFER TO THE INVESTOR OR THE HOMESEEKER (1915). 
 44.  See JENKS, supra note 5, at 14174; see generally Michael E. Neagle, “That 
Magnificent Land of Sunshine, Health, and Wealth”: How U.S. Entrepreneurs Sold Cuba’s Isle 
of Pines, 11 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 575 (2012). 
 45.  Carmen Diana Deere, Here Come the Yankees! The Rise and Decline of United States 
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relatively undeveloped eastern end of the island and on the Isle of Pines, 
truck gardening for export principally developed in the western provinces 
of Havana and Pinar del Rio, which had rail access to the port of 
Havana.46  
Table 1 presents a detailed breakdown of Cuba’s NST agricultural 
exports during the period of the U.S. occupation (1900–02), immediately 
after the implementation of the Reciprocity Convention (1903–05) 47 and 
post-WWI (1919–21).48 During these decades relatively low U.S. import 
duties prevailed and a number of tropical agricultural products entered 
the U.S. duty free. Of the latter, only the value of Cuban exports of 
bananas and plantains was of substantial magnitude in 1903-05 and made 
up a significant share of U.S. imports. The latter fell from 15% to 4% in 
the aftermath of World War I. The Cuban market share of fresh coconuts 
also fell precipitously over this period, as did that of cacao.  
Cuban cacao production fell after World War I primarily due to the 
expansion of sugar cane production.49 During the “Dance of the 
Millions,” when sugar prices reached unprecedented heights, cacao trees 
were uprooted to make way for cane, and a similar fate may also have 
affected coconut groves. Citrus groves in Oriente were uprooted as well, 
and even coffee production, which tended to be located in the more 
mountainous regions, suffered from the fever to use more land for sugar 
production.50 While Cuban coffee exports to the United States show a 
slight recovery post-WWI, the value of coffee exports remained quite low 
                                                                                                                     
Colonies in Cuba, 1898–1930, 78 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 729, 73031 (1998).  
 46.  FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, supra note 43, at 6667. The establishment of Cuba’s first modern 
agricultural experiment station in 1904, the Estación Central Agronómica, in Santiago de Las 
Vegas, in Havana province facilitated these latter efforts. U.S. professionals largely staffed the 
station up through the teens, and carried out many of the field trials on the farms of colonists in 
this region. Id. at 274.  
 47.  Note that the Reciprocity Convention did not go into effect until late December 1903. 
That was also the first full year that Cuba was an independent republic and the year by which 
Cuban exports had recovered from the War of Independence and even surpassed 1895 export 
levels. Cuba’s second War of Independence ran from 1895 to 1898, with the United States 
intervening only in 1898, which quickly concluded the war. Reconstruction under U.S. military 
rule was a slow process, given the level of destruction in the countryside. Louis A. Pérez, 
Insurrection, Intervention, and the Transformation of Land Tenure Systems in Cuba, 1895–1902, 
65 HISP. AM. HIST. REV., 229, 234–35 (1985). 
 48.  This three-year average has the advantage of smoothing out any potential impact of the 
1919 “Dance of the Millions” when world sugar prices reached unprecedented heights, as well as 
the depression of 1920, when sugar prices crashed. JENKS, supra note 5, at 206.  
 49.  FRANCES ADAMS TRUSLOW, REPORT ON CUBA: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
AN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL MISSION ORGANIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA IN 
1950, at 823 (1951).  
 50.  Deere, supra note 45, at 75556.  
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and the country never regained market share from its main Latin 
American competitors.  
The positive impact of the Reciprocity Convention can be seen in 
terms of the performance of those fruits and vegetables that paid duties 
and gained the 20% tariff reduction (shown as ‘dutied’ in Table 1). The 
value of ‘all other fruits,’ principally pineapples and grapefruit, almost 
tripled from 190305 to 191821. In the early post-WWI period, Cuba 
supplied 99% of U.S. imports of pineapples and 95% of grapefruit. The 
value of Cuban exports of vegetables also grew spectacularly, although 
the magnitude of pineapple exports dwarfed it. In this period, Cuba 
supplied 12% of U.S. imports of ‘other vegetables,’ principally winter 
truck-garden crops; nonetheless, U.S. imports from Mexico and Canada 
dominated this rubric.51 
Overall, in 1903–05 some 70% of Cuban agricultural exports other 
than sugar and tobacco consisted of duty free traditional products, with 
those subject to duties comprising 30%. Post-WWI the decline of 
traditional NTS agricultural exports combined with the incentive 
provided by a duty differential of 20% reversed this relationship: of the 
total annual average of exports to the U.S. market of these products, $3.1 
million, traditional NST exports constituted only 30%, and non-
traditional exports made up 70%. Thus, one of the beneficial impacts of 
the Reciprocity Convention in its initial decades was to broaden and 
diversify Cuba’s agricultural exports.  
The 1922 Fordney-McCumber Act ushered in a period of higher U.S. 
tariffs, which peaked with the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. Cuba, with its 
automatic 20% reduction on U.S. tariffs, should have been somewhat 
buffered from the full effect of U.S. protectionism as compared to other 
foreign suppliers. However, the higher U.S. tariffs of the 1920s 
disadvantaged Cuba with respect to domestic producers of similar 
commodities, such as Cuba’s budding fresh fruit and vegetable industry. 
Duty free items, which consisted of tropical products the United 
States did not produce, were the least likely to be affected by rising U.S. 
protectionism. Taken together, imports of these traditional NST 
commodities from Cuba show steady growth over the decade of the 
1920s, led by imports of bananas, with only modest increases in imports 
of other duty free fruit, principally avocadoes.52 Nonetheless, Cuba did 
                                                                                                                     
 51.  Unfortunately, disaggregated import data on these ‘other vegetables’ is only provided 
from 1934 on.  
 52.  Carmen Diana Deere, The ‘Special Relationship’ and the Challenge of Diversifying a 
Sugar Economy: Cuban Exports of Fruits and Vegetables to the United States, 1902 to 1962, tbl.5 
(Cuba-U.S. Agric. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1, June 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694831 [https://perma.cc/S3PX-GVBN]. 
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not manage to significantly increase its market share of these products 
over this decade.53  
Turning to dutied commodities, while the value of imports of ‘all 
other fruits’ increased from an average $1.7 million in 1918–21 to a peak 
of $3.2 million in 1922–25; thereafter it declined steadily until the late 
1930s.54 This trend mirrors that of fresh pineapple imports from Cuba, 
which was the island’s most important non-traditional agricultural 
export.55 Grapefruit imports also show a steady decline in the average 
value of imports over the decade of the twenties.56 Since Cuba remained 
the United States’ main source of foreign imports of these commodities, 
this suggests that higher tariffs and more intense domestic competition 
most adversely affected these two products in the 1920s. U.S. domestic 
production of grapefruit doubled between the early 1920s and 1930s, so 
Cuba provided only a negligible share of total U.S. consumption.57  
In the 1920s, winter vegetables provided the most spectacular 
increase in Cuba’s non-traditional exports to the United States, as their 
value more than tripled from 1918–21 to the end of that decade, reaching 
an average $1.6 million, with tomatoes accounting for almost half of the 
latter value.58 By the late 1920s Cuba supplied 18% of U.S. tomato 
imports and 23% of other winter vegetables, principally cucumbers, 
eggplant, peppers and okra.59 It was the leading foreign supplier of these 
other truck crops, surpassed by Mexico only with respect to tomato 
exports.60  
Due in part to the impact of higher tariffs—as well as of periodic 
quarantines the United States placed on Cuban fruit after the black fruit 
fly appeared on the island—many American colonies, particularly those 
focused solely on citrus production, went into decline after World War 
I.61 Across the island, different factors also contributed to the decline of 
the colonies: ferocious hurricanes that particularly affected citrus 
production on the Isle of Pines, the 1917 Liberal uprising that led to some 
destruction in the colonies of eastern Cuba, the departure of many young 
U.S. citizens to fight in World War I, and the rise in land prices during 
the Dance of the Millions.  
                                                                                                                     
 53.  Id. at tbl.6. 
 54.  Id. at tbls.4, 5. 
 55.  Id. at tbl.5. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  AGRICULTURE OF CUBA, supra note 1.  
 58.  Deere, supra note 52, at tbls.4, 5.  
 59.  Id. at tbl.6.  
 60.  Id. at 8. 
 61.  Id. at 18.  
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In 1930, the Times of Cuba provided a list of the main fruit and 
vegetable producers who exported their produce to the United States. It 
included only 104 citrus growers, 133 vegetable growers, and 17 mixed 
growers. Some 80% of the remaining citrus growers had English 
surnames and concentrated on increasingly larger holdings in the Isles of 
Pines. Spanish surnames were more prominent among the vegetable 
growers, constituting 44% (along with 9% with Japanese surnames who 
may also have been Cuban citizens), and these exporters were more 
geographically dispersed. Pineapple production, generally based on 
medium-size plantations, had also passed to mainly Cuban growers by 
this time.  
The contraction in U.S. aggregate demand as a result of the Great 
Depression led to a fall in the value of Cuba’s exports of fruits and 
vegetables to the United States from an annual average of $5.6 million in 
the late 1920s to $4.6 million in the early 1930s.62 Interestingly, non-
traditional exports suffered greater losses than traditional NST exports, 
principally because U.S. banana imports remained relatively stable while 
coffee and avocado imports from Cuba increased substantially.63 The 
increase in coffee imports from Cuba stems from the growth of Cuban 
domestic production in response to the import-substitution policies that 
the country adopted in 1927.64 Cuba’s share of the U.S. coffee market, 
nonetheless, remained negligible, while that of bananas increased 
marginally.65  
Among non-traditional fruit and vegetable exports, fresh pineapple 
declined particularly steeply, reflecting both the expansion of U.S. 
domestic production and the development of Cuba’s pineapple canning 
industry in this period; Cuba also began to export processed fruit.66 The 
fall in grapefruit imports may partly reflect other internal factors, such as 
declining production from the now aging citrus groves on the Isle of 
Pines, which had been planted at the beginning of the century.67 Foreign 
competition was not a major factor, since Cuba continued to supply 
almost all of U.S. imports of pineapples and grapefruit in the early 
1930s.68 In contrast, winter vegetables lost some market share and 
overall, the decreased U.S. demand most likely affected those products, 
                                                                                                                     
 62.  Id. at tbl.5. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT IN CUBA: 
BASIC INFORMATION FOR UNITED STATES BUSINESSMEN 4041 (1956). 
 65.  Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.5. 
 66.  AGRICULTURE OF CUBA, supra note 1, at 61. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.5. 
11
Deere: The Challenge of Diversifying a Sugar Economy
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
170 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29 
 
in addition to Cuba’s two main traditional exports, sugar and tobacco.69  
IV. FROM THE 1934 RECIPROCITY TREATY TO THE 1959 REVOLUTION  
The severity of the depression in Cuba was one of the reasons 
President Roosevelt urged speedy approval of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement.70 The Agreement entered into effect in September of that 
year, in time to encourage a spurt in winter vegetable production during 
late 1934.71 Recall that this treaty gave Cuba substantial duty reductions 
on vegetables and certain fruits during the U.S. off-season.  
As Table 2 shows, one of the Treaty’s positive immediate effects was 
making Cuba the most important foreign supplier of a broad range of 
vegetables, and maintaining its dominance in U.S. grapefruit and 
pineapple imports. However, because of continuing stagnant demand for 
fresh produce in the United States as the Depression ran its course, the 
total average annual value of imports of non-traditional agricultural 
exports from Cuba continued to fall in the 1934–37 period and did not 
reach its 1922–25 peak again until the post-WWII period. 
Another factor that affected the total value of Cuba’s non-traditional 
exports was competition from both U.S. domestic producers and Mexico. 
U.S. production of fresh fruits and vegetables expanded rapidly from the 
1940s on, making Cuba competitive primarily during the off-season in 
California, Arizona and Florida, which coincided with the months when 
it had special duty concessions. The concentration of these Cuban exports 
in a few months of the year also caused marketing problems. The winter 
vegetable crop was usually auctioned as a boatload in the New York City 
market, often depressing prices below the Cuban wholesale price. In 
contrast, U.S. domestic competitors had more stable operations, since 
they could sell smaller quantities throughout the growing season and had 
more diverse markets.72 The declining Cuban share of foreign imports 
such as tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, and pineapple, shown in Table 2, 
is primarily due to competition from Mexico.  
Graph 1 presents the long-term view of U.S. imports of fresh fruit, 
vegetables, and tree crops from Cuba, from 1903 to 1962, in constant 
prices. It shows that the most important period of growth of non-
                                                                                                                     
 69.  Id. 
 70.  STEWARD, supra note 4, at 92–93. 
 71.  The data for 1934 reported in Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States 
is already broken down to reflect imports from Cuba which came in under the special treaty rates 
versus the normal 20% duty reduction, demonstrating the immediate impact of the 1934 Treaty. 
 72.  TRUSLOW, supra note 49, at 866. 
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traditional agricultural exports was in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. After peaking in 1922–25, the contribution of non-traditional 
exports stagnated, and then fell after 1959. Traditional NST exports show 
a different trend. After falling abruptly in the early decades, they 
recovered through the Great Depression, to subsequently fall again 
through the early 1950s. The abrupt increase in the mid-1950s was 
primarily due to a surge in coffee exports, production that had been 
increasing in Cuba since the late 1920s.  
The growth of Cuba’s fruit and vegetable processing industry from 
the 1930s on provide the bright spot in this story, especially as an industry 
that was largely developed by Cubans. Cuba’s first modern pineapple 
canning factory dedicated to the export market dates from 1928, and two 
others began operations in 1937 and 1939.73 From this period on, 
processed pineapple exports to the United States began to gain ground on 
fresh pineapple exports. Tomatoes were the main processed vegetable, 
with modest volumes of canned tomatoes exported to the United States 
when domestic surpluses warranted it. 
From 1947 to 1962, the combined value of Cuban exports of 
processed fruits, nuts, and vegetables to the United States almost rivaled 
that of fresh products.74 With the exception of the early 1950s, the 
average annual value of Cuban exports of processed fruits to the United 
States exceeded that of fresh fruits, with the dominant product being 
prepared and canned pineapple. Moreover, Cuban exports of processed 
fruit captured a larger share of the U.S. import market than did fresh fruit, 
assisted by the preferential duty reduction of the 1934 Treaty.75 
While the fruit and vegetable sub-sector both expanded, diversified, 
and generated forward linkages to agro-industrial processing in the post-
World War II period, this sub-sector never constituted more than 4% of 
total Cuban exports to the United States, and generally much less. Sugar 
and sugar-based products continued to dominate exports, representing 
from 81% to 85% of Cuban exports to the United States from 1947 to 
1952, and then from 75% to 79% from 1953 to 1960. Tobacco and cigars 
followed, constituting between 6% and 9% from 1947 to 1960.76  
The relative decline of sugar exports in total Cuban exports to the 
United States after 1953 is partly related to the development of new 
agricultural and agro-industrial exports in the 1950s, as well as to the 
                                                                                                                     
 73.  JOHN WILLIAM LLOYD, PAN AMERICAN TRADE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRUITS AND 
VEGETABLES (1942).  
 74.  Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.10. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at tbl.11.  
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growth of non-agricultural exports related to mining and manufacturing 
activities. The new agricultural sector exports of the 1950s consisted 
primarily of livestock by-products and shellfish. However, while rivaling 
the fruit and vegetable sub-sector, these new exports never exceeded 
much more than 2% of total Cuban imports to the United States.77  
The total value of U.S. imports from Cuba reached a historic high of 
$518 million in 1958, only slightly exceeding the previous 1947 peak, 
though it represented a significant decline in constant 1960 dollars (from 
$682 million to $531 million).78 The agricultural and agro-industrial 
sector’s share of total Cuban exports to the United States, from the late 
1940s to the late 1950s, declined; this share, however, never dropped 
below 87% (in 1957), illustrating some of the broader diversification of 
the Cuban economy that took place in this period.79  
The continuing importance of sugar in the Cuban economy became 
starkly apparent in 1960 when the United States cut Cuba’s sugar import 
quota, and the value of total Cuban exports to the United States 
plummeted to $35 million in 1961 compared to $342 million the previous 
year.80 The last imports into the United States from Cuba, during 1963, 
were tobacco products that entered the United States prior to the embargo 
and were released from custom warehouses later that year.81 
V. CONCLUSION 
The dominance of sugar in the Cuban economy obscures the 
considerable diversification in Cuban agricultural exports to the United 
States that took place in the early decades of the 20th century and later, 
in the post-World War II period. The 20% discount on U.S. duties 
provided by the 1902 Reciprocity Convention served as an important 
incentive for both American and Cuban growers to experiment with new 
crops and develop non-traditional exports geared to the U.S. market.  
As Figure 1 showed, Cuba’s non-traditional agricultural exports to 
the United States grew rapidly through the mid-1920s, led by pineapple 
and grapefruit exports, commodities in which Cuba became almost the 
sole foreign supplier. The growth of U.S. protectionism appears to have 
cut short the potential dynamism of these non-traditional fresh fruit and 
vegetable exports, combined with the Great Depression, which severely 
                                                                                                                     
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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constricted external demand throughout the decade of the 1930s, and 
increasing competition from U.S. domestic producers.  
Compared with the 1902 Reciprocity Convention, the 1934 
Reciprocity Agreement had a smaller positive effect on the production 
and export of non-traditional fresh fruit and vegetable exports. Cuba’s 
recovery from the Great Depression is more closely associated with the 
better performance of the traditional NST exports, such as bananas and 
avocados, particularly due to the more favorable terms that sugar 
acquired in the U.S. market. While the treaty, which concentrated Cuban 
exports in the U.S. winter season, initially created an almost exclusive 
market for some vegetable exports, such as cucumbers, eggplants and 
okra, Cuba’s share of U.S. imports vacillated considerably, usually 
because of competition from Mexico. This particularly impacted the most 
important crop in export volume, tomatoes. While Cuban tomato exports 
reached a high of 43% of U.S. imports in 1938–1941, after World War II 
they never represented more than 9%, irrespective of their privileged U.S. 
duty treatment.  
The rather flat trajectory depicted in Figure 1 of Cuban non-
traditional fresh fruit and vegetable exports from the mid-1920s to the 
years immediately preceding the 1959 Revolution raises the question of 
why the favorable treatment ceded to Cuban products in the U.S. market 
did not create more diversification in Cuban agricultural exports. A 
number of factors—both external and internal—explain the overall 
underwhelming performance of this sub-sector in terms of the value of 
exports achieved.  
Among the external factors was vacillating U.S. trade policy over 
these sixty years. During periods of high protectionism, Cuba’s special 
relationship to the United States somewhat buffered it from foreign 
competition. However, increases in U.S. tariff levels made Cuba less 
competitive against U.S. domestic producers. In addition, U.S. 
production of fruits and vegetables expanded rapidly over this period, as 
did the California, Texas, and Florida fruit and vegetable industry lobby. 
Moreover, as scientific understanding of fruit and vegetable pests and 
diseases improved, the United States implemented new sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations that continually raised the bar on the quality of 
imports. These explanations, however, do not shed much light on why 
Mexico gained U.S. market share on Cuba in these commodities, a topic 
that needs to be explored in more depth.  
Internal Cuban policies and dynamics also contributed to the 
relatively weak performance of this sub-sector. The policies focused on 
creating the conditions for profitable sugar production and exports, and 
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to a lesser extent, for tobacco, the second major export. Cuba’s other 
traditional agricultural export products, such as coffee, cacao, coconuts, 
and bananas, often languished, suffering from neglect. Since these 
commodities, along with those from every other country, entered the 
United States duty free, Cuba’s exports had to be internationally 
competitive to gain market share. Only avocados performed well, 
primarily because during most of this period they had exclusive duty free 
access to the U.S. market during the off-season for U.S. domestic 
production, and eventually would become the star performer of the 
traditional NST agricultural exports in the post-World War II period. 
The concentration of land, labor, capital, and agricultural research on 
sugar stymied diversification in multiple ways.82 In most periods, the 
price sugar exports could command in the United States likely made 
growing sugar cane more profitable than any other agricultural activity. 
Growing cane may also have been less risky than fresh fruit and vegetable 
production, providing growers with little incentive to diversify. In 
addition, both traditional NST and non-traditional agricultural exports 
suffered directly from “sugar mania” as they were displaced whenever 
high sugar prices prevailed. Rising sugar prices at various times resulted 
in the uprooting of tree crops such as cacao, coffee, coconuts, and citrus, 
as well as the conversion of lands in banana and vegetable production to 
sugar cane production. These factors partly explain why, even under 
favorable tariff concessions for fruits and vegetables, Cuba often lost U.S. 
market share to foreign competitors such as Mexico throughout these 
sixty years. 
From an economic development point of view, the bright spot in the 
otherwise discouraging trajectory of non-traditional fresh fruit and 
vegetable exports was the backward and forward linkages that these 
products generated in the Cuban economy. The value of exports of 
processed fruit in the post-World War II period came to rival that of fresh 
fruits, while the growth of the domestic vegetable and fruit canning 
industry contributed somewhat, if insufficiently, to decrease Cuba’s 
dependence on food imports.  
Among the lessons that can be drawn from this analysis of Cuba’s 
special relationship with the United States from 1903 to 1960 is that 
preferential tariffs can be a powerful stimulus, yet by themselves may not 
be sufficient to transform a country’s export profile. A number of other 
factors need to be in place in order to both develop and sustain the growth 
of non-traditional exports, such as agricultural research, and financing 
and marketing channels, to mention a few. 
                                                                                                                     
 82.  See generally FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, supra note 43. 
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Looking forward to the eventual normalization of U.S.-Cuban trade, 
the world is a much different place than in 1959. U.S. tariff levels have 
fallen to historic lows and trade agreements have proliferated globally. In 
the hemisphere, the United States now has free trade agreements with 
Mexico and Canada (NAFTA), Central America and the Dominican 
Republic (CAFTA), Chile, Panama, and Colombia. This means that once 
the U.S. embargo is lifted, and full U.S.-Cuba trade can resume, Cuba 
may find itself in the position of being among the few Latin American 
countries facing full tariffs for its products in the U.S. market. Given the 
historical record of trade reviewed in this paper, the current privileged 
position of Mexico in the U.S. market for fresh and processed fruits and 
vegetables may disadvantage Cuba. Whether Cuba will attempt to once 
again compete with Mexico in this sub-sector, or focus its efforts on sugar 
and sugar by-products, or on non-agricultural sectors in which it holds a 
potential comparative advantage, remains the big question.  
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Table 1. U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruit, Vegetables and Tree Crops 
















Free of duty       
Coffee 4,994 negl 6,159 negl 28,199 negl 
Cacao 292,347 5.2%f 197,709 3.9% 84,110 negl 












Other fruita 13,664 3.9%f 19,060 4.3% 93,666 3.8% 
Sub-total, free 850,448  1,756,003  944,929  
Dutied       























Grapefruit n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 477,200 95.3% 
Other citrusb 1,391f negl 3,007 negl 7,006 negl 
Otherc 238,190 18.7%f 654,916 29.3% 42,927c 2.1% 



























Potatoes 6,915f neglf 5,444 negl 49 negl 












Total 1,141,661  2,512,983  3,104,347  
Notes:  
“negl” = negligible, less than 1% 
a Other fruit refers largely to avocados which were mostly imported duty free. 
b Oranges, limes and lemons. 
c Primarily avocados on which duty was charged. 
d For 1903, includes dried beans and peas; for 1918-21, dried beans and lentils. 
e Includes tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, peppers, & other fresh vegetables which 
are not reported separately until later years. 
f Two-year averages since data for 1900 not available either for imports from Cuba 
or for total U.S. imports for that category. 
                                                                                                                     
83 Deere, supra note 52, at tbl.4; compiled from U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN 
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1906–1946) (from General 
Imports, in multiple volumes). 
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Pineapple 98.5% 89.6% 62.4% 77.5% 83.9% 
Grapefruit 97.0% 99.3% 99.9% 93.9% 96.5% 
Beans negl.  7.0% 15.5%  0.6%  0.2% 
Tomatoes 17.6% 39.8%  9.2%  6.4%  8.7% 
Cucumber n.a.* 98.3% 79.8% 90.3% 75.7% 
Eggplant n.a.* 94.1% 53.4% 85.8% 53.7% 
Okra n.a.* 99.5% 99.9% 99.5% 99.5% 
 
*: Listed in “other vegetables” of which Cuba supplied 23.3% of U.S. 
imports in 1926–1929. 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
84 Compiled from Deere, supra note 52, at tbls. 6, 9. 
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Graph 1: Value of U.S. Imports of Fresh Fruit, Vegetables and 




        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Note: Traditional imports are those that traditionally entered the United 
States duty-free; non-traditional are those that paid duty and were subject 
to preferential tariffs. 
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